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Introduction∗
Systems have a lot of virtues. Among their abilities, the theoretical ones
are often underlined. First, the system, defined as a rational organization of
philosophical discourse, gives consistency : it assures that there is no contra-
diction between the propositions constituting the theory. It also offers unity :
every part of the theory is bound to a single principle. It eventually allows
for completeness: the author as well as the reader are sure that no proposi-
tion is missing, since each one stays exactly at its place, leaving no lacuna.
Systematicity thus guarantees scientificity, which is the highest theoretical
virtue for which one can hope, even when systematicity is not claimed and
remains implicit.
But one is led to examine whether systems may also have some teaching
virtues, especially in moral philosophy — thus not only theoretical virtues,
but also practical ones. Are systems appropriate ways of teaching the path
to wisdom? To consider this question, two philosophical schools will be
compared: stoicism in the Western tradition and confucianism in the ancient
Chinese tradition.
1 Systematicity as the royal way to wisdom
It has often been said that the Stoics invented systematicity. Without, of
course, being the first philosophers to try and develop a consistent theory,
they are said to have paid particular attention to dividing philosophy in a
few domains — ethics, physics and logic — and showing the links between
those fields. Long and Sedley thus write that “Of all ancient philosophies,
Stoicism makes the greatest claim to being utterly systematic. Arguably, the
Stoics invented the notion of philosophy as “system1” [...].” I do not intend
∗The author would like to thank Ève Morisi, Xiè J¯ıng (谢晶) and Pierre Ponchon for
their precious help and advice.
1A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1987, p. 160.
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to examine whether this precedence is historically valid, but I will try and
show which systematicity is engaged in Stoic philosophy.
Indeed the risk is to interpret retrospectively the ancient notion of system,
keeping in mind the later fortune of this concept, and especially Kant’s or
Hegel’s views about, and use of, systems. That Stoics have promoted systems
for their theoretical virtues, above all for consistency and completeness, is
beyond doubt, and — rightly — often emphasized. Victor Goldschmidt has
shown how the Stoic theory of time not only belongs to physics, but is also
correlated to ethics and even logic. For instance, physics shows that only the
present exists, and that past and future do not exist in a strong sense; ethics
thus claim that I have to keep my mind on the present, preventing myself
from any remorse or hope2. Ethics plays in this insightful analysis the role
of an object for the system — time indeed has an ethical meaning —, but
the system as educational method does not explicitly seem to possess any
ethical virtue: only theoretical ones.
Less often mentioned are the educational virtues systems had for the
Stoics, however important it may have been for them. The goal of Stoic
philosophy is not exclusively theoretical. Wisdom is aimed beyond science,
as Seneca writes: “I will state the difference between wisdom and philoso-
phy. Wisdom is the human mind’s good brought to perfection. Philosophy
is the love and pursuit of wisdom; it strives for the goal which wisdom has
achieved3.” And the fact that philosophy intends to lead to wisdom is cor-
roborated by the ternary division of virtue (ἁρετή, arétè), i.e. excellence,
reported by Aetius: “The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of
the divine and the human, and that philosophy is the practice of expertise
(τέκνη, techne) in utility. Virtue singly and at its highest are triple — the
physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one. For this reason philos-
ophy also has three parts — physics, ethics and logic4.” Philosophy leads
to wisdom because they share the same structure. There is more: wisdom
preserves, at the highest level, the content of philosophy.
Even the order of the parts of philosophy may have an educational mean-
ing. While it is an order of importance, it also refers to an order of teaching,
showing what the last goals of philosophical learning are. Several different
orders have been proposed: some Stoics “assign the first place to logic, the
second to physics and the third to ethics; these include Zeno in his book
On Discourse, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. Diogenes of Ptole-
mais starts with ethics, Apollodores puts ethics second, while Panaetius and
Posidonius start with physics5.” This order may also appear as an order of
exhibition, if we presume that the most important parts of philosophy are
2Victor Goldschmidt, Le Système stoïcien et l’idée de temps, Collège philosophique,
Paris: Vrin, 1953, ch. 3, iii, p. 73.
3Seneca, Letters, 89, 4–5. See Long and Sedley, op. cit., 26 G, p. 160.
4Aetius I, Preface 2, SVF II, 35. See ibid., 26 A, p. 158.
5Diogenes Laërtius VII, 39–41. See ibid., 26 B, p. 158.
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treated at the end of the curriculum, insofar as they require the knowledge
of the other parts.
Emphasizing the theoretical virtues of systems in Stoic philosophy —
consistency, unity and completeness — as it has often, and rightly, been
done, should therefore not hide some of its practical virtues recognized and
promoted by the Stoics. Systematicity in itself does not directly lead to
wisdom, but is the best way to express philosophy, which in turn leads to
wisdom, once excellence is reached. It is not enough to say that systematicity
does not obstruct the quest for wisdom: it is, in fact, the royal way that leads
to it.
2 Systematicity as obstructing the Way to wisdom
A glimpse at ancient Chinese philosophical texts suffices to establish that
few are systematic. Why is that?
For theoretical reasons, one might think, concerning ancient Chinese cos-
mology, as it was developped since the Yìj¯ıng (易經), which describes the
world in an ever-changing state6. For theoretical reasons too, if all phenom-
ena are relative, as in Zhua¯ngzi (莊子, Tchouang-Tseu), or if language is not
trustworthy, as in Laˇozi (老子, Lao-Tseu)7. With regard to these ancient
Chinese philosophies, the lack of systematicity is not surprising.
More unexpected is the fact that even some relatively systematic philoso-
phies can refuse the systematic way of teaching. It is mainly the case of
Confucius’ thought8. The comparaison may be all the more instructive as
Confucian philosophy has often been compared with Stoicism9.
Of course, the word “system” is nowhere to be found in Confucius’ work,
which is not expressed in a systematic way, consisting in a set of words or acts
of the Master related by his disciples, similarly to Epictetus’ Discourses; but
this did not prevent Confucius from expressing himself about notions which
constitute the concept of system in the Western tradition.
6Although we could have expected a systematic treatment from this book, which is
structured by regular combinations of plain lines “—” (陰, y¯ın) and broken ones “– –” (陽,
yáng).
7The Book of Way and Virtue begins with the words:
“The way that can be spoken of
Is not the constant way;
The name that can be named
Is not the constant name.”
See Laozi, Tao Te Ching (道得經, Dàodéj¯ıng), Penguin Classics, translated by D. C. Lau,
London: Penguin Books, 2006, 1: 《道可道非常道，名可名非常名》.
8Koˇngfu¯zˇı (孔夫子).
9Both link cosmology and ethics, cosmological and social order. The notion of duty
(κατήκοντα or officia in Stoic philosophy) is not universel, but depends from the social
position. This last point is exactly what distinguishes Mencius’ (孟子, Mèngzi) orthodox
confucianism from Mòzi’s (墨子) thought.
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Consistency is the minimal condition for a theory to be a system; it can
without doubt be expected from Confucius. But there is more: even unity —
the fact that several theories are correlated to a single principle — is claimed.
Confucius strongly asserts this last criterion of “systematicity:” “There is a
single thread binding (貫, guàn) my way (道, dào) together10.” Further he
also claims, in almost the same words: “I have a single thread binding it all
together11.” Thus Confucius does not deny, nor minimize, the consistency
and unity of his thought: he emphasizes it.
Concerning completeness, some passages in the Analects, especially the
sixteenth chapter, consist in a set of lists: three kinds of beneficial friendship,
of harmful friendship, of beneficial pleasures, of harmful pleasures, etc. But
these lists have no regularity, no rule of construction; they are very rare in
Confucius’ work; and above all, their authenticity is very doubtful. Confucius
thus emphasizes unity but avoids completeness.
Confucius’ relation to the form of his moral philosophy is itself regulated
by educational interest. The way in which thoughts are exhibited is not
neutral with respect to the content of the lessons. Confucian philosophy may
be a system, but is not exposed as such. Keeping silent about what makes
from the system a totality allows for the revelation of disciples’ qualities12.
The good student is the one who can develop by himself what follows from
the thoughts of his master: “Ah, dear Zígòng (子貢)! I eventually can talk
to you about the Book of Odes (詩經, Sh¯ıj¯ıng)! Tell such a man something
and he can see its relevance to what he has not been told13.” This criterion,
which characterizes good students, also enables the master to identify bad
ones: “When I have pointed out one corner of a square to anyone and he does
not come back with the other three, I will not point it out to him a second
time14.” Thus the real wise is not the one who has reached excellence in all
the fields of philosophy, as in the Stoic notion of wisdom; he is the one who
can see much further than what the master says. As Confucius compares
two of his disciples, Yán Huí (顏回)15 and Zígòng, the latter tells him: “How
dare I compare myself with Hui? When he is told one thing he understands
10Confucius, The Analects ( 論語, Lúnyuˇ), Penguin Classics, translated by D. C. Lau,
London: Penguin Books, 1979, IV, 15: 《吾道一以貫之》.
11Ibid., XV, 3: 《子一以貫之》.
12A deep analysis of ancient Chinese teaching strategy, especially in Confucian philos-
ophy, can be found in François Jullien, Le Détour et l’accès. Stratégies du sens en Chine,
en Grèce, Paris: Grasset, 1995, ch. ix. In the same book, François Jullien highlights the
theoretical reasons of this educational strategy and compares it, among other things, to
military strategy.
13Confucius, op. cit., I, 15. See also III, 8 for an example of a good disciple, under-
standing and pursuing the master’s thought, and therefore able to talk with him from the
Sh¯ıj¯ıng
14Ibid., VII, 8.
15Yán Huí, who died precociously, was Confucius’ favorite disciple; see ibid., V, 25; VI,
2, 5 and 9; VII, 10; IX, 10, 19 and 20; XI, 2, 6–10, 22; XII, 1; and probably, following the
tradition, VIII, 5.
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ten. When I am told one thing I understand only two16!” Refusing any
systematic discourse, any claim to sufficiency, is therefore a way to let the
disciples become intellectually autonomous. The most important quality is
not to know, be it at the highest level of excellence, but to study (學, xué)17.
Completeness is educationally dangerous: it prevents the students, but also
the master, from studying.
3 Conclusion
Thus a difference emerges between two educational strategies. The Stoics
choose systems in order to promote an idea of excellence, which implies an
excellence of knowledge. Confucius, who avoids systems, reveals and shapes
the understanding abilities of his disciples.
This conflict of strategies finds an analogon in mathematics, the theo-
retical science par excellence. While Euclides develops his mathematics in a
systematic way, and tends to generality, the Nine Chapters, a classical book
of Chinese mathematics, only exhibits particular cases. Not by inability, as
Karine Chemla has shown18, but by choice: the reader has to find truths
by himself. This confrontation reveals that systematicity does not only raise
theoretical problems, but also educational ones.
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